Induction is a form of reasoning from the particular example to the general rule. However, establishing the truth of a general proposition is problematic, because it is always possible that a conflicting observation to occur. This problem is known as the induction problem. The sunrise problem is a quintessential example of the induction problem, which was first introduced by Laplace (1814). However, in Laplaces solution, a zero probability was assigned to the proposition that the sun will rise forever, regardless of the number of observations made. Therefore, it has often been stated that complete confidence regarding a general proposition can never be attained via induction. In this study, we attempted to overcome this skepticism by using a recently developed theoretically consistent procedure. The findings demonstrate that through induction, one can rationally gain complete confidence in propositions based on scientific theory.
Introduction
In the era of artificial intelligence, learning from experience (induction from data) becomes crucial to drawing valid inferences. Induction is a form of reasoning from particular examples to the general rule, in which one infers a proposition based on data. Originally, the goal of science was to prove propositions (scientific theory) such as "all ravens are black", or to infer them from observational data. However, the difficulty of deriving such inductive logics has been recognized as the problem of induction since the Greek and Roman periods. Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus questioned the validity of inductive reasoning, "positing that a universal rule could not be established from an incomplete set of particular instances. Specifically, to establish a universal rule from particular instances by means of induction, either all or some of the particulars can be reviewed. If only some of the instances are reviewed, the induction may not be definitive as some of the instances omitted in the induction may contravene the universal fact; however, reviewing all the instances may be nearly impossible as the instances are infinite and indefinite (Heinemann, 1933, p. 283 )". Hume (1748) argued that inductive reasoning cannot be justified rationally because it presupposes that the future will resemble the past. Kant (1781) proposed a resolution to the induction problem, which involved considering the propositions as valid, absolutely a priori. Popper (1959) suggested realizing the falsification of propositions instead of proving them or trying to view them as valid. Broad (1923) stated that "induction is the glory of science but the scandal of philosophy". However, induction may also be viewed as a scandal of science if there is no way to confirm scientific theories with complete confidence via induction. Therefore, in this study, we attempt to demonstrate that if a scientific theory on how the future data are generated is available, an inductive reasoning can be justified rationally based on the scientific theory, whose role is an axiom in mathematics.
The question addressed in this work is whether via scientific induction, a scientist (or ar-tificial intelligence) can obtain complete confidence regarding a general proposition. We use probability as the main tool, and for the purpose of this work, we limit ourselves to two concepts of probability. The first concept is Kolmogorov's (1933) formal mathematical probability of random events such as coin tossing, which relates to the long-run rate of observable events (Von Mises, 1928) ; this aspect involves the P-value and coverage probabilities of the confidence intervals. The second concept concerns the logical probability of a proposition, developed for the scientific induction being true. Bayes (1763) introduced a logical probability; however, he might not have embraced the broad application scope now known as Bayesianism, which was in fact pioneered and popularized by Laplace (1824) as an inverse probability. Bayesianism been applied to all types of propositions in scientific and other fields (Paulos, 2011) . Savage (1954) provided an axiomatic basis for the Bayesian probability as a subjective probability. It is of interest to derive an objective logical probability. Fisher (1930) developed an alternative logical probability, namely, fiducial probability, which is based on the P-value. Neyman (1937) introduced the idea of confidence, represented by the coverage probabilities of confidence intervals. The confidence allows for a frequentist interpretation of the long-run rate of coverage if the confidence intervals are repeatedly produced over different observations. Schweder and Hjort (2016) viewed the confidence as the Neymanian interpretation of Fisher's logical probability. Recently, there has been a surge of renewed interest in the confidence as an estimate of the logical probability (Xie and Singh, 2013 ).
An inductive logic is based on the idea that the probability represents a logical relation between the proposition and the observations. Accordingly, a theory of induction should explain how one can ascertain that certain observations establish a degree of belief strong enough to confirm a given proposition. Let G be a general proposition, such as "all ravens are black" or "the sun rises forever", and E be a particular proposition or an observation (evidence) such as "the raven in front of me is black" or "the sun rises tomorrow". Then, we can use the logical probability to represent a deductive logic: P (E|G) = 1 and P (not E|G) = 0.
The logical probability can be quantified as a number between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates impossibility (the proposition is false) and 1 indicates certainty (complete confidence; the proposition is true). Thus, deductive reasoning can help attain complete confidence, provided that the basic premises such as the axioms are true. The use of the logical probability for scientific reasoning was proposed by Cox (1946) .
The logical probability allows us to represent the inductive logic as follows:
provided that the denominators are not zeros. From (1) , we see that one observation of a nonblack raven can certainly falsify the general proposition. Popper (1959) saw this falsifiability of a proposition as a criterion for scientific theory; if a theory is falsifiable, it is scientific, and if not, then this theory is unscientific. From (2), we see that a particular observation can corroborate the general proposition.
Laplace (1814) elaborated on the Bayesian approach to compute the logical probability.
However, Broad (1918) indicated that Laplace's solution involved the assignment of a zero probability to the general proposition, regardless of the number of observations made. To this end, in this study, the confidence resolution of the induction problem was realized by demonstrating that complete confidence on a general proposition can be achieved via induction based on a finite number of observations. We also demonstrate that the attained complete confidence is theoretically consistent.
Laplace solution to the sunrise problem
The Bernoulli model was developed for random binary events such as coin tossing. Suppose that a coin was tossed, but the outcome is unknown. The logical probability for a general proposition would be like the probability of a coin toss, whose outcome is unknown as the truthfulness of Prior to the knowledge of any sunrise, suppose that one is completely ignorant of the value of θ. Laplace (1814) represented this prior ignorance by means of a uniform prior π 0 (θ) = 1 on θ ∈ [0, 1]. This uniform prior was first proposed by Bayes (1763) . Given the value of θ and no other information relevant to the question of whether the sun will rise tomorrow, the probability of the particular proposition E that the sun will rise tomorrow is θ. However, we do not know the true value of θ. Thus, let T n be the number of sunrises in n days. We are provided with the observed data that the sun has risen every day on record (T n = n). Laplace, based on a young-earth creationist reading of the Bible, inferred the number of days by considering that the universe was created approximately 6000 years ago. The Bayes-Laplace rule defines the posterior, logical probability given data,
which is a proper probability for θ; consequently, the probability statements for θ can be estab-lished from this posterior. As described in the supplementary materials, given n = 6000×365 = 2, 190, 000 days of consecutive sunrises, the logical probability of E is
The probability of this particular proposition, that is, the sun rising the next day, is eventually one as the number of observations increases. However, this aspect is not sufficient to confirm the general proposition G that the sun rises forever. Broad (1918) showed that P (G|T n = n) = 0 for all n; there is no justification whatsoever for attaching even a moderate probability to a general proposition if the possible instances of the rule are many times more numerous than the instances already investigated (See Senn (2003) for a more thorough discussion). Thus, the Bayes-Laplace rule cannot overcome the degree of skepticism raised by Hume (1748).
Popper (1959, p 383) concluded that the presence of observations cannot alter the zero logical probability. In Carnap's inductive logic (1950), the degree of confirmation of every universal law is always zero. Therefore, the universal law cannot be accepted, but is not rejected until conflicting evidence appears.
Jeffreys' resolution
The fact that laws cannot be confirmed via scientific induction based on the Bayes-Laplace rule means that the choice of the prior had been wrong. Jaynes (2003) argued that a beta prior
, with beta(·, ·) being the beta function, α > 0 and β > 0, describes the state of knowledge that we have observed α successes and β failures prior to the experiment. The Bayes-Laplace uniform prior π 0 (θ) = 1 is the Beta(1, 1) prior, which means that the experiment is a true binary one in the sense of physical possibility. This phenomenon explains why we cannot attain complete confidence of G by using the Bayes-Laplace rule. The Beta(1, 1) prior means that a trustworthy manufacturer sent you a coin with information that he/she observed one head and one tail in two trials before sending the coin.
Even if you have an experiment with heads only for many trials, there is no way to attain complete confidence on θ = 1, unless you discard the manufacturer's information. In this case, Jeffreys' prior (1939) is Beta(1/2, 1/2), but any prior with α > 0 and β > 0 cannot overcome the degree of skepticism, i.e., P (G|T n = n) = 0.
Jeffreys' (1939) resolution was another prior, which places a mass 1/2 on the general proposition θ = 1 and a uniform prior on [0,1) with 1/2 weight. Then, as described in the supplementary materials, we have P (E|T n = n) = (n + 1)(n + 3) (n + 2) 2 and P (G|T n = n) = n + 1 n + 2 .
Jeffreys' resolution produces an important innovation of the Bayes factor for hypothesis testing 
and thus, P (G|T n = n) increases to one eventually. Using this resolution, a hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, the scientific induction cannot attain complete confidence even in this era of big data, because such a process requires infinite evidence.
Confidence resolution
Different priors lead to different logical probabilities. Savage (1954) interpreted these probabilities as subjective probabilities, depending upon personal preferences. It can be controversial to allow personal preferences in scientific induction. The question is, however, whether we can form an objective logical probability without presupposing a prior. Newton and Einstein may not believe a priori that their laws are true with half of their personal probability. Fisher (1930) derived, when T n is continuous, an alternative approach using the P-value which has been widely used for scientific inferences. As shown in the supplementary materials, we derive a logical probability using Pawitan's (2003, Chapter 5) right-side P-value P (T n ≥ t|θ) for discrete T n . This P-value leads to a logical probability P (E|T n = n) = 1, so that P (G|T n = n) = 1.
According to this confidence resolution, P (G|T 1 = 1) = P (G|T 2 = 2 = 1) = · · · = P (G|T n = n) = 1, and P (G|T i = i) ≤ P (G|T i+1 = i + 1) = 0 for any i ≤ n. This allows the realization of complete confidence even with a finite n. As shown in the supplementary materials, a prior can be induced from the logical probability, which can be obtained from the Bayes-Laplace rule using the induced prior. The right-side P-value P (T n ≥ t|θ) is an unobservable random variable because the true value of θ is unknown, and according to Pawitan and Lee (2020) the Bayes-Laplace rule is also an update rule for the likelihood for unobservable events (Lee et al.,
2017).
In the supplementary materials, we demonstrate that the confidence leads to two potential induced priors, specifically, Beta(0, 1) and Beta(1, 0). Although these priors are improper, π(θ)dθ = ∞, they allow a reasonable interpretation; for example, the Beta(0, 1) prior indicates that only one failure is observed a priori. Thus, if we observe all the failures, it is legitimate to attain complete confidence on θ = 0. However, even if we observe all the successes, we can never attain complete confidence on θ = 1 because of the failure a priori. The
Beta(1, 0) prior exhibits the contrasting property.
The confidence resolution leads to simultaneous hypothesis testing and estimation of the confidence density (or probability) function for the confidence intervals. As described in the supplementary materials, for example, under the induced prior Beta (1, 0) , the Bayes-Laplace rule leads to a posterior (confidence density), for t = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1
From this confidence density, we can form a confidence interval for θ, and the actual coverage rates in finite sample were reported by Pawitan (2001; Chapter 5). When T n = n, the discrete posterior (confidence) P (θ = 1|T n = n) = 1 is attained. Thus, with T n = n, the 100% confidence interval for θ is {1}. In the recent developments of the confidence theory, the confidence density is viewed as an estimate of the true but unknown logical probability, leading to consistent interval estimation. The coverage probability is a long-run rate of the coverage of the confidence interval in hypothetical repetitions. Thus, the confidence concept is a bridge between the Kolmogorov and logical probabilities. We may view the Bayesian posteriors as estimates of the true logical probability (confidence). In this case, the consistency of the estimations becomes important.
Oracle hypothesis testing and confidence estimation
Our confidence resolution provides an extension of the oracle property of a recent interest for simultaneous hypothesis testing and point estimation (Fan and Li, 2001 ). The oracle works as if it is known in advance whether the general proposition is true or not. We may define the oracle property as the attainment of complete confidence in finite samples. Thus, P (G|T n = n) = 1
is an oracle estimator of the true logical probability. To form an oracle procedure, Lee and Oh For example, Carnap's (1950) degree of confirmation of the general proposition G by the evi-
Popper (1959) equated the confirmability with "refutability". We see that P (G) = 0 leads to P (G|T n = n) = 0 in the sunrise problem.
In Jeffreys' (1939) resolution with P (G) = 1/2, C(G, T n = n) = P (G|T n = n) − P (G) = n/{2(n + 2)} > 0, and thus the evidence T n = n confirms the general theory G positively.
However, in the confidence resolution, although the prior P (G) is not defined, complete confidence (confirmation) P (G|T n = n) = 1 is achieved. Both the resolutions are consistent, regardless of whether G is true or false. However, the former is not an oracle because it cannot attain complete confidence on the general proposition in a finite sample whereas the latter can.
In this study, the Bayesian prior, Bayes rule, Fisherian P-value, fiducial probability and Neymanian confidence ideas are combined to resolve the induction problem, facilitating the attainment of complete confidence.
Concluding remarks
Through deduction, one can achieve complete confidence regarding a particular proposition E P (E|G) = 1,
provided that the general proposition G is true. Through induction, we see that one can attain complete confidence regarding the general proposition P (G) ≤ P (G|E)(= P (G|T n = n)) = 1.
Considering the information provided by the data, we can be certain that the sun rises forever, provided that the assumed scientific (binomial) model is true. (Of course, in physics, the sun runs out of energy, and the solar system vanishes eventually.) To establish the universal laws from the particular instances by means of induction, scientists (or artificial intelligence) do not need to review all the instances but to establish a scientific model pertaining to the generation of the instances. To confirm the validity of the general relativity theory, the observational evidence of light bending was obtained in 1919 and the astrophysical measurement of the gravitational redshift was obtained in 1925. Thus, a new theory was confirmed based on a few observations.
The oracle confidence resolution shows that such an inductive reasoning is theoretically consistent and therefore rational. More supporting evidence corroborates the consistency of the oracle estimation of the logical probability. If a long existing scientific theory has not been refuted by conflicting evidence, it is theoretically consistent to claim complete confidence regarding the general propositions derived by the existing scientific theory. The role of the scientific theory in a scientific induction is the same as that of an axiom in a mathematical deduction. Thus, a scientific theory can be falsified or confirmed via induction. If one drops an apple, one can be sure that it will fall unless the Newtonian laws suddenly stops to hold. Indeed, induction can be the glory of both science and philosophy.
Supplementary materials
Bayesian approach Laplace (1814) used the Bernoulli model as an instant of scientific theory for the sunrise problem. Let X = (X 1 , · · · , X n ) be independent and identically distributed Bernoulli random variables with the success probability θ. Once we observed data x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ), we have the likelihood
where t = x i . Prior to knowing of any sunrise, suppose that one is completely ignorant of the value of θ. Laplace (1814) represented this prior ignorance by means of a uniform prior π 0 (θ) = 1 on θ ∈ [0, 1]. Let T n = X i . To find the logical conditional probability of θ given T n = n, one uses the Bayes-Laplace rule: The conditional probability distribution of θ given the data x is called the posterior
where
where b(·, ·) is the beta function. Let E be a particular proposition that the sun rises tomorrow. Then, P (T n = n) = b(n + 1, 1) = 1/(n + 1), to give P (E| It has risen n consecutive days)
= P (X n+1 = 1|T n = n) = n + 1 n + 2 = 2190001 2190002 = 0.9999995.
This shows that P (E|T n = n) → 1 as n → ∞.
One observation increases the probability of the particular proposition from n/(n + 1) to (n + 1)/(n+2), so that the increment of probability is (n+1)/(n+2)−n/(n+1) = 1/{(n+1)(n+ 2)}. Thus, the probability of this particular proposition will be eventually one. However, this is not enough to ensure the general proposition G that the sun rises forever holds (Senn, 2003) . The probability that the sun rises in the next m consecutive days, given the previous n consecutive sunrises, is P (X n+1 = 1, ..., X n+m = 1|T n = n) = P (T n+m = n + m|T n = n) = n + 1 n + m + 1 .
As long as n is finite, the probability of the general proposition G becomes zero because for all n > 0 P (G|T n = n) = lim m→∞ P (T n+m = n + m|T n = n) = 0.
Consider Jeffreys's prior, which places 1/2 of probability on θ = 1 and puts a uniform prior on [0,1) with 1/2 probability. Then, P (T n = n) = 0.5{1 + 1/(n + 1)} to give P (E|T n = n) = P (T n+1 = n + 1|T n = n) = 1 + 1/(n + 2) 1 + 1/(n + 1) = (n + 1)(n + 2) (n + 2) 2 , P (T n+m = n + m|T n = n) = 1 + 1/(n + m + 1) 1 + 1/(n + 1) = (n + 1)(n + m + 2) (n + 2)(n + m + 1) .
Thus, P (G|T n = n) = n + 1 n + 2 .
Confidence approach
Let T be a continuous sufficient statistics for parameter θ. Let t be an observed value of T. Define the right-side P-value function
Given t, as a function of θ, C(t, −∞) = 0 and C(t, ∞) = 1 and C(t, θ) is a strictly increasing function of θ. Thus, C(t, θ) behaves as if it is the cumulative distribution of θ. This leads to the confidence density for θ, analogous to the Bayesian posterior P (θ|t) = dC(t, θ)/dθ, which is the fiducial probability of Fisher (1930) , not using a subjective prior. Schweder and Hjort (2016) called it the confidence density. Fisher considered cases for T to be continuous. However, in practical applications T does not have to be continuous. In the Bernoulli model, T n is a sufficient statistics but is discrete. The so-called 'exact inference' from discrete data can be expressed in terms of confidence density. Consider the conservative right-side P-value
This leads to the confidence density
which gives a conservative confidence interval (Pawitan, 2001; Chapter 5) . See Pawitan and Lee (2020) for a more thorough discussion. Because the confidence density is analogous to the posterior, the induced model prior is
which is objective because it is directly obtained solely from the model. However, the model prior c 0 (θ) ∝ θ −1 , namely the Beta(0, 1) distribution, is improper to give 1 0 c 0 (θ)dθ = ∞. Necessary computations of Beta(0, 1) can be obtained as the limit of proper Beta(a, 1) distribution for a > 0. The confidence density can be viewed as the posterior (2) but replacing the confidence prior c 0 (θ) by the Bayesian prior π 0 (θ).
This leads to P (T n = n) = θ n−1 dθ = 1/n to give P (X n+1 = 1|T n = n) = P (T n+1 = n + 1) P (T n = n) = n n + 1 , P (T n+m = n + m|T n = n) = P (T n+m = n + m) P (T n = n) = n n + m .
Given n, P (G|T n = n) = lim m→∞ P (T n+m = n + m|T n = n) = 0. Thus, this confidence density cannot overcome the degree of scepticism yet. Now apply the confidence to the transformed data, by defining Y i = 0 if the sun rises in the ith day, where P (Y i = 1) = θ * = 1 − θ and θ is the long-run frequency of sunrises. Thus, θ * = 1 is equivalent to θ = 0. Then,
to give P (G|T * n = 0) = P (G|T n = n) = lim m→∞ P (T * n+m = 0|T * n = 0) = 1.
Because P (G|T n = n) = 1, under the transformed data, we can say that the sun will always rise with the logical probability being one. It is a little disturbing that the confidence statement depends upon the scale of the data X i and Y i = 1 − X i to which the confidence procedure is applied. Now we see the consequences and show that the resulting confidence procedures are consistent.
Because the confidence interval for θ * is easily transformed to that of θ, we can readily apply the confidence to the transformed data. This leads to the confidence density and the Beta(1, 0) model prior P (θ|t) = P (θ * |n − t) ∝ θ t (1 − θ) n−t−1 and c 0 (θ) ∝ P (θ|t)/L(θ) = (1 − θ) −1 .
This model prior leads to P (X n+1 = 1|T n = n) = lim a↓0 b(n + 2, a) b(n + 1, a) = 1, to give P (G|T n = n) = lim m→∞ P (T n+m = n + m|T n = n) = 1.
We can interpret a Beta(α, β) prior with α > 0 and β > 0 as describing the state of knowledge that a priori we have observed α successes and β failures. Then, P (X n+1 = 1|T n = n) = Beta(n + 1 + α, β) Beta(n + α, β) = n + α n + α + β and P (X n+1 = 0|T n = 0) = Beta(α, n + 1 + β) Beta(α, n + β) = n + β n + α + β .
Thus, P (X n+1 = 1|T n = n) → 1 as β → 0 and P (X n+1 = 0|T n = 0) → 1 as α → 0. Jaynes (2003) argued that the Bayes- Laplace Beta(1, 1) prior is the state of knowledge in which we have observed one success and one failure a priori the experiment. Thus, we know that the experiment is a true binary one, in the sense of physical possibility. This explains why we cannot reach a sure confidence of the general proposition with the Bayes-Laplace uniform prior because one day of no sunrise is assumed a priori. Thus, it cannot be an ignorant prior. Suppose that you were sent a coin from a manufacturer who informed you that before sending the coin an experiment was done and found one head and one tail in two trials. Even if you have done an experiment with heads only for many trials, there is no way to have the sure confidence on θ = 1 if you accepts the manufacturer's information.
The model priors Beta(0,1) and Beta(1,0) allow a possibility that θ = 0 and θ = 1, respectively. The Haldane (1932) prior, namely the Beta(0, 0)∝ θ −1 (1 − θ) −1 , means that no success
